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Abstract
Chinese development assistance in the Pacific
has attracted increasing attention since the 1st
China-Pacific Island Countries Economic
Development and Cooperation Forum in
2006, at which China announced US$492
million in concessional loans to the region.
Another US$1 billion in concessional loans
was announced at the 2nd China-Pacific
Forum in 2013. This article explores how
Pacific island governments negotiate and
oversee the implementation of Chinese official
development assistance in four Pacific Island
case study countries where assistance has
been significant: Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa and
the Cook Islands. We argue that the way in
which governments have pursued, overseen
and implemented projects has differed consid-
erably, and is an important determinant of the
effectiveness and developmental impact of
Chinese assistance.
Key words: Chinese aid, Pacific Island coun-
tries, China Eximbank, development assis-
tance, Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
1. Introduction
Chinese development assistance in the Pacific
has attracted increasing attention since the 1st
China-Pacific Island Countries Economic
Development and Cooperation Forum in 2006,
at which China announced renminbi (RMB) 3
billion (US$492 million) in concessional loans
to the region. Many studies have focused on
geostrategic implications of such assistance,
and on the relationship between China and tra-
ditional aid donors (Henderson & Reilly 2003;
Windybank 2005; D’Arcy 2007a; Hanson &
Fifita 2011; Yang 2011). Pacific Island schol-
ars have examined how Pacific Island govern-
ments have encouraged, and benefited from,
competition between major donors (Powles
2010; Tarte 2010; Wesley-Smith 2010, 2013).
However, as discussed below, none of these
studies specifically examines aid effectiveness,
nor do they look in detail at how Pacific Island
governments negotiate or oversee Chinese aid
projects.
This article addresses this research gap by
exploring how four Pacific Island governments
have pursued and implemented Chinese aid
projects, and by discussing the impact of these
approaches. Our results are based on inter-
views with 50 civil servants, political and busi-
ness leaders, and Chinese embassy staff across
four Pacific Island case study countries:
Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa and the Cook Islands,
as well as New Zealand. Chinese contractors
responsible for implementing aid projects in
these countries declined to be interviewed.
Chinese assistance to the four case study coun-
tries, situated in both Polynesia and Melanesia,
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has been both significant and at times contro-
versial. The research reveals that the approach
of governments in negotiating, overseeing
and/or implementing Chinese aid projects has
differed considerably. We argue that this is an
important determinant of the effectiveness and
developmental impact of Chinese assistance to
each country.
2. Background
2.1 China and the Pacific Islands
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a
strong and growing engagement in the Pacific
Islands region. China currently has diplomatic
relations with eight countries—the Cook
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa,
Tonga, and Vanuatu. The region has been the
site of very active ‘chequebook diplomacy’ in
the past decade, as Taiwan also has six diplo-
matic allies in the Pacific (Hanson & Fifita
2011). Pacific Island leaders have not been
passive in this; Pacific Island scholars have
documented how governments have played
China and Taiwan off against one another in
order to secure greater resources (Crocombe
2007; Tarte 2010; Wesley-Smith 2010, 2013;
Varrall 2012). Such overt ‘chequebook diplo-
macy’ has now largely come to an end. China
and Taiwan negotiated a tacit ‘agreement’ to
no longer engage in overt tactics designed to
buy off each other’s diplomatic allies after the
election of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou
in 2008. Although some Pacific Island govern-
ments have continued to ‘play the Taiwan
card’, no Pacific Island country has been suc-
cessful in switching allegiance since the 2008
agreement.1
China disbursed approximately US$850
million in bilateral aid to the eight Pacific Island
countries that recognise the PRC between 2006
and 2011. As a point of comparison, Australian
aid to the Pacific Islands in the same period
totalled US$4.8 billion (Hayward-Jones 2013).
A large component of this Chinese assistance
was the 2006 ‘soft loan facility’—an RMB 3
billion regional funding facility negotiated and
disbursed bilaterally. Many of these loans took
a number of years to be implemented (Brant
2013). More recently in November 2013, a new
regional assistance package was announced at
the 2nd China-Pacific Islands Countries Forum
in Guangzhou. The most significant outcome
was the announcement of up to US$1 billion in
concessional finance, to be provided over four
years (Xu & Zhao 2013). China also announced
a commercial loan facility of US$1 billion,
administered through China Development
Bank (CDB).
There is a large and growing literature on
Chinese engagement in the Pacific. Much
of the early literature that was focused on
the geopolitical implications for traditional
powers in the region was alarmist in nature.
Henderson and Reilly (2003) argued that
China ‘is incorporating the Pacific Islands
into its broader quest to become a major
Asia-Pacific power’, with Henderson (2001)
characterising the Pacific as ‘undergoing a
geopolitical transition from American to Asian
influence’. This body of literature typically
portrayed Pacific Island countries as ‘vulner-
able to manipulation’ (Windybank 2005).
Subsequent work has provided a more bal-
anced perspective, emphasising the potential
benefits of Chinese assistance for Pacific
Island countries (Wesley-Smith 2010, 2013;
Zhang 2010) and highlighting the active role
played by Pacific Islanders in negotiating geo-
political tensions (Tarte 2010; Wesley-Smith
2010, 2013). Some of these authors have
examined the implications of China’s presence
in the region for Australia and New Zealand
(D’Arcy 2007a), while others have focused
instead on what it means for Pacific Islanders
(Iati 2010; Langa’oi 2010; Tarte 2010;
Wesley-Smith 2010). A broader literature is
concerned with the Chinese diaspora in the
Pacific (see, for example, D’Arcy 2007b,
Nelson 2010, Smith & D’Arcy 2013).
1. In mid-2011, Vanuatu’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
stated his intention to establish a trade office in Taiwan
(and alluded to full diplomatic relations). He also wrote a
letter to China asking it to provide funds to meet Vanuatu’s
US$32 million budget shortfall, which the Chinese
Ambassador agreed to provide ‘part of’ but only according
to China’s own conditions and capacity (i.e. continued
support of the One China policy).
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None of this literature has considered
Chinese assistance from an aid effectiveness
perspective, nor has it provided detailed analy-
sis of Chinese development assistance in
Pacific Island countries. Chinese assistance is
instead normally discussed in the abstract,
with little distinction between different aid
modalities. The Chinese government is also
generally treated as a homogenous entity, with
no discussion of the various actors involved in
the negotiation and delivery of Chinese devel-
opment assistance.2 Some useful research is
now emerging on the ‘bottom-up’ processes of
Chinese aid, including the role of Chinese
companies (see Smith 2013); however, these
studies have not focused on the roles played by
Pacific Island governments in negotiating and
overseeing assistance.
2.2 China’s Foreign Aid Program
An understanding of China’s foreign aid
program is important. A key problem in the
literature on Chinese aid is the tendency to
lump all of the different types of Chinese eco-
nomic engagement together under the label
‘aid’. Partly, this results from China’s lack of
transparency in the types and terms and con-
ditions of its assistance. It is also sometimes
the result of lazy or confused analysis (see, for
example, Lum et al. 2009).
In April 2013, the Chinese government for
the first time provided an annual figure (RMB
40 billion or US$6.4 billion) for its global aid
budget (Du 2013). This places the amount of
Chinese assistance on an approximate level
with mid-level OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) donors such as
Australia. Chinese bilateral foreign aid is pro-
vided in three forms: grants and interest-free
loans administered through state finances,
and concessional loans administered through
China Eximbank. China utilises these modali-
ties for different kinds of support and accord-
ing to its assessment of the recipient country’s
financial management and situation.
Interest-free loans are usually provided for
20 years, which includes five years of use, a
five-year grace period, and 10 years of repay-
ment (People’s Republic of China 2011). These
loans are used for public facilities and projects
that ‘improve people’s livelihood’. The repay-
ment terms can be renegotiated, and outstand-
ing debts can be cancelled (in effect turning
them into grants). Grants are not usually dis-
bursed as cash, but rather are provided ‘in-
kind’, and are used for small and medium-size
projects that improve ‘social welfare’, for
humanitarian aid, and as other in-kind assis-
tance. Grants are commonly given in amounts
of either RMB 10 million (US$1.64 million) or
RMB 20 million (US$3.28 million). Small cash
donations are also sometimes provided, usually
in response to natural disasters or humanitarian
emergencies.
Concessional (or preferential) loans are pro-
vided to fund larger projects, with a minimum
loan of RMB 20 million (US$3.28 million)
and a current annual interest rate of between
2–3 per cent, with 15–20 year repayment after
an initial 5 to 7-year grace period (People’s
Republic of China 2011). These loans are
provided by China Eximbank ‘under the
designation of the Chinese Government’. The
objective of these concessional loans is to
‘promote economic development and improve
living standards in developing countries’, and
to ‘boost economic cooperation between deve-
loping countries and China’. Projects must be
able to yield ‘sound economic returns’ or gen-
erate ‘social benefits’. Interestingly, one of the
key principles is that ‘the borrowing country
shall have sound diplomatic relations with the
Chinese Government, and shall be politically
stable and economically sound, with debt
servicing capacity and reliable contract-
performance record’ (China Eximbank 2011,
2. Iati’s (2010) examination of Chinese development assis-
tance to Samoa provides a good example of the problems
that can result. Iati is very positive about China’s assistance
to Samoa, with one of his principal arguments being that
China’s ‘cancellation of Samoa’s hefty debt is a prominent
sign that Beijing does not intend to hold Samoa to ransom
for any of its assets’.Although we do not take issue with this
general argument, Iati’s failure to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of Chinese loans is problematic. The ‘hefty’
debt to which Iati refers involved MOFCOM interest-free
loans that were valued at approximately US$11 million,
and the debt cancellation in question formed part of a
broader initiative in 2006, described below. Iati ignores
debts to China Eximbank, which are of far greater value and
are discussed below, and which were never cancelled.
Dornan and Brant: Chinese Assistance in the Pacific 351
© 2014 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
emphasis added). Unlike the interest-free
loans, concessional loans are not easily can-
celled or rescheduled (Brautigam 2009).
Chinese ‘aid’ is not conceived as a separate
policy; aid flows are but one (small) element
within China’s economic statecraft, which also
includes official loans at commercial rates,
export credits and suppliers’ credits. Chinese
foreign aid has (non-political) conditions
attached, reflecting the links between aid,
investment and development. For Eximbank’s
concessional loans, the contractor must be a
Chinese company and (in principle) at least 50
per cent of materials must be procured from
China. For projects funded through grants or
interest-free loans, similar conditions apply. In
this sense, Chinese aid is heavily criticised by
other donors (and recipients) for being ‘tied’.3
The tied nature of Chinese aid fits with
its idea that aid should be ‘win-win’, with
Chinese companies, suppliers, and workers
also benefiting from the provision of assis-
tance. Foreign aid is an important part of the
Chinese government’s ‘go global’ strategy,
providing support to Chinese companies to
gain overseas experience, as well as future
investment and market access opportunities.
There are further domestic drivers for the tying
of aid, which Alden and Chen (2009, p. 9)
summarise well:
A strong rationale in the form of Chinese com-
petitiveness; the oversupply of local firms in
areas like construction; cultural cohesion; and
work ethic; as well as familiarity with Chinese
government procedures, are all features that
explain the preference for use of Chinese firms
and factors of production in the delivery of
projects.
There are a number of actors within the
Chinese state apparatus involved in China’s
foreign aid policy and program management.
The State Council sets the policy direction, the
Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) within the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages
the program, the Ministry of Finance approves
the budget, and other ministries and govern-
ment bodies are also involved in providing
specific sectoral aid—such as scholarships
through the Ministry of Education and medical
assistance through the Ministry of Health. As
mentioned, China Eximbank and Chinese
companies have executing and implementing
roles.
Embassies also play an important role, par-
ticularly because the Department of Foreign
Aid (within MOFCOM) has no overseas
offices and thus no direct in-country project
managers. In partner countries, generally a
single official—usually the Economic and
Commercial Counsellor—in the Chinese em-
bassy has responsibility for the aid program. In
addition, Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplo-
mats provide advice to Beijing about the aid
projects for a particular country. The Chinese
Ambassadors can provide some grants directly
themselves, at their discretion.
Chinese contractors are heavily involved in
the implementation of Chinese aid projects.
Companies must be on the ‘list of approved
companies’ in order to tender for projects,
and this process is managed by MOFCOM.
The companies are state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), many of which grew out of former
government departments or bodies but are now
usually disconnected from the government
aid apparatus. They are important actors in
China’s foreign aid program, often being the
‘face’ of China within recipient communities.
The role of contractors and other key actors in
the negotiation and implementation of Chinese
assistance in four Pacific Island case study
countries is discussed below.
3. Case Studies
3.1 Tonga
Tonga is the Pacific Island country where
Chinese assistance has arguably been most
prominent. MOFCOM has funded a number
of grant-based infrastructure projects in
the past 10 years, including construction of
two high school buildings, the National Con-
vention Centre and refurbishment of the
3. This point is often lost in studies by Pacific Island
scholars, which instead emphasise the ‘conditionality’ of
aid provided by traditional powers, and contrast it to the
(incorrectly labelled) ‘no strings’ attached approach of
China (see, for example, Iati 2010, Langa’oi 2010).
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Dateline Hotel. Grant-based assistance to
Tonga announced by China has increased
recently, with the delivery (somewhat contro-
versially) of an MA60 aircraft for domestic use
by Royal Tonga Airlines, and the proposed
construction of the St George Palace office
block in 2013–2014 and 2014–2015.4 Assis-
tance of this type has been ‘lumpy’, varying
considerably in value from year to year (assis-
tance will jump from US$0.34 million in
2012–13 to US$20.38 million in 2013–14
according to budget estimates).
More significant than grant-based assistance
is concessional lending. Since 2008, Chinese
assistance to Tonga has been dominated by
two large China Eximbank concessional loans,
which commenced in November 2008 and
March 2010. The first China Eximbank loan to
Tonga arose as a result of the 2006 riot, which
saw the destruction of much of the central
business district of Nuku’alofa. The loan of
RMB 440 million (approximately US$72.14
million) dwarfed earlier assistance from
China. It was approved by parliament for
reconstruction of the Nuku’alofa central busi-
ness district, and involved both civil works
elements and an on-lending facility for private
sector businesses affected by the riot. A second
loan of RMB 291 million (approximately
US$47.71 million) was agreed to 18 months
later for road construction and rehabilitation.
Both loans were denominated in Chinese
RMB, were to be provided for a period of 20
years with a five-year grace period, and were
to accrue interest at a rate of 2 per cent; stan-
dard Chinese concessional loans.
The loans have been criticised on numerous
grounds. At a macroeconomic level, there are
concerns about the indebtedness of the Tongan
government. Public debt in Tonga is 43
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), the
majority of which is external debt (39 per cent
of GDP). The two loans from China Eximbank
account for 64 per cent of this debt stock,
while 2.2 per cent is owed to the Bank of
China. As a result, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) had until recently labelled Tonga
as being at high risk of external debt distress.5
Debt remains a significant burden for the
Tongan economy. The current Tongan govern-
ment has established a ‘no new loans’ policy in
recognition of the difficulties it will encounter
in future years servicing its debt obligations.
At the same time, the Tongan Prime Minister
has requested that the Eximbank loans be con-
verted into grants. Repayment of the first
Eximbank loan was to have begun in 2013–14,
with repayments rising to over 17 per cent
of government revenue in 2014–15 when
repayment of the second loan commenced.
However, China agreed recently to defer these
repayments in response to requests from the
Tongan government. Although there is lack
of clarity and detail about this agreement,
interviewees confirmed that repayment has
been deferred for five years, but that the
20-year maturity does not change. This means
that annual repayments will be larger when
they begin in 2018–19.
There has also been criticism within Tonga
about how the two China Eximbank loans
were agreed, and of the way in which the
funding has been used. The negotiation and
establishment of both loans was led by the
Prime Minister at the time, the Hon Dr Feleti
Sevele, with the support of His Majesty King
George Tupou V. Input from the civil service
in negotiations was, by almost all accounts,
limited. The Ministry of Finance advised the
government against the first loan given its
fiscal implications and resultant foreign
exchange risk. This advice was dismissed. Par-
liament approved the loan for reconstruction
work. However, there was limited uptake of
loans offered to businesses that had been
destroyed in the riots. Consequently, approxi-
mately 38 per cent of funding was actually
used for construction of Vuna wharf and exten-
sion of the Royal Palace; something that has
led to significant criticism and two politically
4. The donated aircraft was criticised on safety grounds,
with New Zealand suspending its assistance to Tonga’s
tourism sector in protest.
5. This rating has now been lowered to moderate risk of
external debt distress, but due to a small improvement in
Tonga’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) scores rather than a reduction in debt levels.
Tongan officials interviewed as part of this research
viewed the improvement with scepticism.
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charged inquiries (Brown Pulu 2012). Interest-
ingly, the fiscal implications of the loan were
barely discussed by parliament. Debate was
instead dominated by parliamentarians arguing
the case for spending outside of Nuku’alofa
(and in their constituencies). This was report-
edly part of the reason that the government
pursued the second loan.
The second loan for road development across
Tonga was also reported by civil servants to be
‘politically driven’. The Ministry of Finance
was not consulted about the second China
Eximbank loan; it was first informed about the
government’s intention to sign the loan agree-
ment through media reports. Loan negotiations
were led by the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Works, with the Prime Minister’s
support. Ministry of Infrastructure officials also
reported being sidelined, both in the negotia-
tion process and in subsequent project selec-
tion.6 Parliament again approved the second
China Eximbank loan with minimal opposition.
Parliamentarians that were interviewed expre-
ssed their belief that both Eximbank loans
would later be converted into grants, pointing
out that this had already occurred in Samoa
(although as described below, this did not occur
for Eximbank loans).
Both loan agreements with China Eximbank
were signed by the Minister of Finance.
Design and contractor agreements were signed
between the Minister of Works and the various
Chinese design and construction companies
that had won the tenders for work. Contractual
agreements were short and sometimes vague.
For instance, there was no reference to dispute
resolution or arbitration; a provision normally
included in such agreements. In its place is a
short provision stating that disputes will be
settled in ‘a friendly manner’. Political leaders
led the negotiations. Civil servants reported
that in some cases, these figures undermined
their attempts to negotiate conditions with
Chinese contractors. In the case of the second
loan, the Ministry of Works was unsuccessful
in requests for translation of design documents
(which were in Chinese) and adherence to
Australian road construction standards, with
which ministry officials are familiar.
Tongan civil servants were also concerned
about oversight arrangements, although con-
struction quality was generally considered
sound. There was dissatisfaction with oversight
by engineers appointed by China Eximbank
and the design company; these groups were
considered to be closely linked to construc-
tion firms. However, neither did the Tongan
government provide adequate oversight of con-
struction. In the case of the loan for road reha-
bilitation, the Ministry of Works responsible
for oversight had limited capacity to oversee
construction, with no fully qualified engineers
or architects, and insufficient government
funding to outsource these activities. In the case
of reconstruction efforts, oversight was the
responsibility of the Nuku’alofa Development
Corporation (a Cabinet sub-committee), which
outsourced project oversight to a clerk of works
from the private sector, Ca’Bella Limited. This
was more effective. However, the arrangement
has been criticised by the opposition, given that
the same company later became a subcontractor
on one of the construction projects (reportedly
at the request of His Majesty King George
Tupou V).
3.2 Samoa
Samoa has a long-standing relationship
with China, having established diplomatic
relations shortly after independence. As in
Tonga, grant-based assistance has been modest
and varied considerably from year to year.
Grant-based assistance has been directed
towards post-tsunami reconstruction (US$5.8
million, 2011–12—2013–14), refurbishment
of facilities for the Pacific Games (US$19
million, 2007) and Women and Youth Hall
($US1.6 million, 2009), agricultural assistance
(US$0.8 million, 2009), and construction of
eight school buildings. Samoa has also ben-
efited from small interest-free loans provided
by MOFCOM. In 2006, these loans were con-
verted into grants by the Chinese government;
6. The Ministry of Works became the Ministry of Infra-
structure in 2012–2013, when it was merged with the
Ministry of Transport and various other small agencies.
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a gesture repeated in other least developed
countries in the region.7
China Eximbank loans are of considerably
greater value than other forms of assistance in
Samoa. Eximbank loans have been provided
in recent years for construction of a number
of prominent public buildings, including
the National Convention Centre (US$52
million, 2008–09—2012–13), the parliamen-
tary complex and adjacent Ministry of Jus-
tice and Courts Administration buildings
(US$41 million, 2008–09—2010–11), a
National Medical Centre and Ministry of
Health Headquarters (US$41 million, 2010–
11—ongoing), and a national broadband
network (US$15 million, 2011–12—ongoing).
The terms and conditions of these Eximbank
loans are identical to those provided in Tonga.
These loans are less significant as a proportion
of total debt than in Tonga. The majority of
public debt in Samoa is held by multilateral
development banks; debt to China measures 16
per cent of total debt (approximately 9.4
per cent of GDP). Aggregate debt levels are
nonetheless very high, at 60 per cent of GDP
in 2012–13, and a ‘no new loans’ policy is
reported to be in place.
The negotiation and implementation of
loans has been less controversial than in
Tonga, although there has been criticism of
travel by senior government officials paid for
by Chinese construction companies (some-
thing that has also occurred in Tonga, the Cook
Islands and Vanuatu).8 An important reason
for the general acceptance of Chinese-funded
projects is the use of clear and transparent
processes for decision-making relating to
development assistance, which have helped
safeguard the role of the civil service in nego-
tiating and overseeing/implementing Exim-
bank loans. Development assistance to Samoa
must conform to 14 sector plans established by
the Samoan government. Development part-
ners meet on a quarterly basis to coordinate
assistance in a meeting led by the Ministry of
Finance. China participates in these meetings,
although is ‘not an active participant’.
Decisions relating to all major government
projects are made by the Cabinet Development
Committee, which is chaired by the Prime
Minister, and includes all Cabinet members,
Chief Executive Officers of government agen-
cies and representatives from the private sector
and civil society. Where development assis-
tance is needed to finance a project, it must
also be approved by a separate committee, the
Aid Coordination Committee, which is again
chaired by the Prime Minister and includes
representatives from relevant ministries. The
Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of
Samoa provide advice to both committees,
which is deemed especially important given
the absence of rigorous cost-benefit analysis or
feasibility studies that accompany Chinese
projects. All loans are approved by parliament
through a supplementary budget.
Oversight of construction in general is more
robust than in Tonga. The Ministry of Works,
Transport and Infrastructure organises over-
sight of Chinese-funded construction projects,
including projects funded through grants and
loans. The Ministry does not have capacity to
perform these roles itself, so for each project it
issues an open tender in order to hire a clerk of
works to oversee construction. These positions
have been filled by both domestic and interna-
tional construction/engineering firms in the
past. Contracts for both China Eximbank loans
and construction works are signed by the Min-
ister of Finance—a point of difference with
Tonga where these roles are split between min-
istries. No Eximbank funds are handled
directly by the Samoan government, but like in
Tonga, the Ministry of Finance must approve
payments from Eximbank to contractors.
7. At the 1st China-Pacific Island Countries Economic
and Development Cooperation Forum in 2006, Premier
Wen announced the following measure: ‘To support the
Pacific island countries in developing their economy and
ease their debt burden, China will give zero-tariff treat-
ment to the majority of exports to China from the least
developed countries in the region that have diplomatic ties
with China. China will cancel their debts that became
mature at the end of 2005 and extend by ten years the
payment of debts contracted by other island countries that
became mature at the end of 2005’.
8. Samoa’s Minister of Finance, Faumuina Tiatia Liuga,
was criticised for a trip to China that was paid for by
Shanghai Construction Group, the company contracted to
build a large civil service building funded by China EXIM
Bank (Samoa Observer 2013).
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Civil servants that were interviewed were
generally satisfied with the projects that had
been implemented, with one noting that ‘con-
struction quality is the same as for other donor
projects’. Decisions relating to project selec-
tion are inevitably political, and the Prime
Minister is known to wield considerable
power. Nevertheless, the processes outlined
above ensure that politicians are aware of the
economic and fiscal impacts of such projects
when making decisions. These decision-
making processes are considered to protect
against ‘dubious deals’, even where Chinese
construction companies lobby political leaders
for work (as also occurs in Tonga). The publi-
cation of loan and grant details by the Mini-
stry of Finance was viewed as an additional
safeguard.
3.3 Vanuatu
Chinese assistance to Vanuatu has received
considerable attention in recent years. As in
Samoa, Chinese assistance has a long history.
Two interest-free loans were provided by
MOFCOM for construction of Parliament
House and the Port Vila campus of the Univer-
sity of the South Pacific (USP) in the 1980s
and 1990s. Both of these were later converted
into grants. Grant-based assistance has been
used to fund construction of sporting facilities
used in the 1983 Pacific Mini Games, dormi-
tories at the USP Port Vila campus, the Mela-
nesia Spearhead Group building, the Vanuatu
Agricultural College and the extension of
Malapoa high school (construction of which
is soon to commence). A more controversial
project funded recently is the National Con-
vention Centre, which critics have labelled
unnecessary given that Vanuatu already has the
Pacific’s largest convention centre (Dorney
2013).
Eximbank loans have been used in recent
years to purchase Y12 aircraft for use domes-
tically by Air Vanuatu, and to fund the
e-government communication system. The
Government of Vanuatu is now actively
seeking new loans from China Eximbank and
other development partners, citing low debt
levels (public debt is 23 per cent of GDP) and
a favourable 2013 IMF Article IV Consulta-
tion. Civil servants and political leaders inter-
viewed for this research noted that in 2013
there has been an influx of Chinese construc-
tion companies into Vanuatu. These compa-
nies present infrastructure project proposals
directly to ministers, and often claim to be able
to arrange financing through China Eximbank.
Five memoranda of understanding (MOUs)
have been signed that allow companies to
undertake feasibility studies for infrastructure
projects, most of which were for road con-
struction in rural areas. The feasibility studies
do not oblige the Vanuatu government to take
on new loans, but they are a first step in secur-
ing Eximbank financing. The documents have
not been made public. One feasibility study
viewed by the authors was more akin to a
project proposal document than a feasibility
study; it contained no substantive economic or
technical analysis but was instead a broad
statement in support of the project.
The most advanced of these new projects
involves the construction of roads in the
islands of Tanna and Malekula by China
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
(CCECC). Civil servants that were interviewed
claimed that an informal agreement for con-
struction was made by the late Minister for
Infrastructure and Public Utilities, Harry
Iauko, prior to the receipt of any advice from
the civil service. This type of arrangement is
reported to be common practice; it is widely
known that Chinese construction companies
offer ministers benefits such as meals and
travel when lobbying for projects (as also has
occurred in other countries). The majority of
civil servants interviewed labelled this ‘cor-
ruption’. However, some justified it on the
ground that politicians simply wanted to
deliver infrastructure services to their constitu-
ents, and were taking matters into their own
hands given the ineffectiveness of government
service delivery. One interviewee described
this as ‘corruption, but not for personal
benefit’. In this sense, it reflects the political
clientelism9 that is present in many developing
9. Political power is described as clientelistic where
policy preferences and the provision of public goods are of
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countries, which in parts of Melanesia has
been compared, controversially, to traditional
leadership by ‘big men’.10
The construction of roads in Tanna and
Malekula provides an interesting illustration
of the tensions that arise in approving con-
cessional loans within the Vanuatu govern-
ment. The loan originated in an informal
agreement between the late minister and the
contractor. The political power of members of
parliament from Tanna ensured that the loan
received the support of Cabinet; it was widely
believed that the government would fall in a
vote of no confidence if the loan did not
proceed. However, there was disquiet about
the lack of consultation with the civil service,
both in regards to the absence of economic
analysis and possible debt implications.
Cabinet therefore made two concessions. It
requested that the contractor fund an economic
cost-benefit analysis of the road, to be con-
ducted by the Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Management. The contractor agreed,
but dedicated very limited resources to the
study, which was based on only 6 days of field-
work by two economists, and lacked necessary
traffic volume data. The second concession by
Cabinet was more significant: the loan amount
was halved, from US$100 million to US$50
million. The revised amount ensures that con-
struction will proceed in Tanna and Malekula
(both political imperatives) but not on other
islands.
3.4 Cook Islands
In the past decade, China has provided some
NZ$37 million (US$34 million) in foreign aid
to the Cook Islands. China has funded four
main buildings in Rarotonga—the courthouse,
police station, Ministry of Education and
stadium. The courthouse and police station
were funded through Chinese grants, and the
stadium and Ministry of Education building
funded through a NZ$13 million (US$10.6
million) concessional loan. China has also
pledged annual small grants, usually used for
purchase of equipment for the outer islands.
The same Chinese company, CCECC, was
contracted to build all buildings over a period
spanning 2004–2009, with one exception.
Unusual within the Chinese aid process, the
Ministry of Education building was con-
structed by a local company. As this was the
first Chinese concessional loan to the Cook
Islands, the government managed to negotiate
a deal that Chinese labourers could be used
during construction of the stadium, but a local
contractor would be engaged for the Ministry
of Education building.
The Cooks Islands has recently negotiated a
new NZ$23 million (US$18.7 million) loan
with China Eximbank to upgrade water infra-
structure on Rarotonga. This is part of a trilat-
eral project also involving New Zealand; the
first such case of a traditional bilateral donor
working with China on a foreign aid-funded
project in the world. The loan was pledged
in 2006 as part of the regional concessional
loan package. The previous Cook Islands
government wanted to borrow NZ$50 million
(US$40.6 million) to finance water infrastruc-
ture. And at one stage, the Chinese loan was to
have formed part of a broader ADB project.
However, the Puna Government, elected in
2010, put a hold on the loan while it assessed
the fiscal situation in the Cook Islands.
Known as Te Mato Vai, the NZ$60 million
(US$48.7 million) project due to commence in
secondary importance, and where politicians instead focus
on providing local public goods or private goods to their
supporters (whose support is contingent on the transfer of
these goods) (Hicken 2011).
10. Politics in Melanesia has been described as
clientelistic by a number of authors, some of whom have
noted the comparison with traditional leadership by ‘big
men’ (Fukuyama 2008). Kabutaulaka (1998), for example,
writes that in Solomon Islands: ‘Voters have the same
expectations of politicians today as the community had of
the traditional Big-Man, and most politicians react to these
expectations as the village Big-Man would have—
distributing wealth to members of the group and partici-
pating financially in nearly every community affair’. Both
arguments are contested, however. Fraenkel (2011) argues
against the use of the term ‘clientelism’ to describe politics
in the Pacific, pointing to the high turnover of MPs and the
fluidity of political allegiances in Melanesia (excluding
Fiji). Haque (2011) takes issue with cultural explanations
of voter behaviour, arguing that voter behaviour is best
explained not as a continuation of traditional political
culture in the form of big man style governance, but rather
in terms of rational responses to ‘material incentives
facing individuals’.
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2014 is the largest infrastructure development
to take place on the island since the building
of the airport in 1974. CCECC, the Chinese
company that built the earlier Chinese aid proj-
ects, has been contracted to implement the
Chinese part of Te Mato Vai. This consists of
laying 26 km of ring mains around the island.
A New Zealand grant (NZ$15 million; US$12
million) is funding other sections/components
of the project, including a master plan and a
project management unit, which will have
oversight of the whole project, including the
Chinese company. According to a number of
officials interviewed, the Cook Islands’
bureaucracy would not have had the capacity
to do this itself. Given concern with pre-
vious Chinese construction, particularly over
designs, quality and supplies, this management
structure will likely be vital to the success of
the project. The Cook Islands government has
also established a formal high-level gover-
nance structure to help mitigate political risks.
The Cook Islands appears to be an unlikely
location for the first trilateral cooperation
project between China and a traditional donor.
However, there are a number of factors that
explain why and how this has come about. First,
and most importantly, this cooperation has been
driven by the Cook Islands itself. Interviews
with key government stakeholders revealed a
strong desire for collaboration rather than com-
petition among donors.Almost all development
partners, including China, participate in devel-
opment partners’ roundtables. Second, China
and New Zealand themselves have a strong
relationship; New Zealand was the first country
to negotiate a free trade agreement with China.
In addition, the Cook Islands’ size and self-
governing state status (in free association
with New Zealand) means that the Chinese
embassy in Wellington is also responsible for
the China–Cook Islands relationship, making
management of the trilateral project more
straightforward. Finally, the project did not
require any new funding commitment from
China; there was an existing loan pledge
waiting to be accessed. With a history of prob-
lematic projects in the Cook Islands, particu-
larly due to poor construction and inappropriate
designs for local conditions, the Chinese gov-
ernment itself has a keen interest in the success
of this trilateral project. A positive political and
development outcome here will help improve
China’s image in the Cook Islands, the broader
region, and with traditional donors.
In terms of grant aid, the Chinese govern-
ment has pledged more than NZ$34 million
(US$27.6 million) in grants to the Cook
Islands over the past 12 years. Of the NZ$34
million, NZ$20 million (US$16 million)
remains unspent.11 Politicians have enjoyed the
flexibility that comes with this aid—a senti-
ment shared by politicians and civil servants in
other case study countries. However, this flex-
ibility has also enabled (some) politicians to
select projects for short-term financial or
political gain. In 2013, the Cook Islands devel-
oped a three-year strategy for the utilisation
of grant funding, to manage the backlog of
Chinese grants. The strategy has been
designed and driven by the Cook Islands to
ensure the grant funds are spent on identified
priority projects within the National Sustain-
able Development Plan, and not redirected at
the whim of individuals. The NZ$20 million
has been assigned to specific items in the
2013–14 budget. This process has been driven
by the Cook Islands bureaucracy and is sup-
ported by the Chinese embassy.
4. Discussion
Chinese assistance has varied considerably
in the four case study countries. In Samoa,
assistance has in general met the expectations
and demands of the recipient government and
civil service. This has not occurred in Tonga
and Vanuatu, where assistance has been more
blatantly political, and oversight and transpar-
ency more limited. Similar issues have arisen
in the past in the Cook Islands, although the
government has recently sought to address
this. The differences between these countries
have arisen as a result of the way in which they
negotiate, coordinate and oversee or imple-
ment development assistance. The case studies
11. This is due to a number of factors, including an inabil-
ity to program funds and internal disagreement of grant
allocation.
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therefore serve to demonstrate how the actions
of Pacific Island governments have an impor-
tant bearing on the actual and perceived effec-
tiveness of Chinese assistance. They also add
weight to the arguments of scholars who argue
that ‘shaping of the emerging regional order is
firmly in the hands of Pacific Island countries’
(Zhang 2010).
The importance of how Pacific Island gov-
ernments negotiate and oversee implementa-
tion of Chinese-funded projects reflects
broader discussions regarding state capacity
and legitimacy in the Pacific. References to
Pacific Island countries as ‘weak’ or ‘failed’
have become common in the last decade, par-
ticularly in relation to Melanesia (as described
by Larmour 2005, Morgan 2005). Pacific
Island scholars such as Larmour (2005) have
documented the ‘mimetic transfer’ of foreign
policies to Pacific Island countries, arguing
that such transfers have produced mixed
results, particularly in cases where donors
have sought to impose a ‘good governance’
agenda (DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Larmour
2005). These arguments are relevant to the aid
effectiveness agenda promoted by the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (and its
subsequent iterations) and the Cairns Compact
on Strengthening Development Cooperation
in the Pacific. Institutional arrangements
designed to improve aid effectiveness, such as
national planning and donor coordination
mechanisms, are successful where driven by
recipient governments.
This is clearly evident in the four case study
countries. All four countries have policy pro-
cesses in place for the consideration and
approval of development assistance. However,
the extent to which these processes actually
influence decision-making varies. In Samoa,
major projects are approved by a committee
with a wide membership base, and develop-
ment assistance is vetted by a second commit-
tee. Both committees are advised by relevant
agencies from the civil service. Such pro-
cesses, although supported by ‘traditional
donors’, have been developed since 2005 by
the Ministry of Finance and are very much
domestic initiatives. They ensure that the gov-
ernment is informed when making decisions
about development assistance, that such deci-
sions are made transparently, and that the civil
service is informed about major projects (even
those it opposes). Donor coordination meet-
ings facilitated by the Ministry of Finance also
help to reduce duplication and target assistance
towards priority areas, although the participa-
tion of Chinese officials in these meetings
could reportedly be improved. In the Cook
Islands, too, the government has recently taken
a lead in managing the development assistance
it receives, particularly through the aforemen-
tioned development partners’ roundtables, in
which the government outlines its priorities
and development plans to all partners, which
then indicate where they can provide support.
The Ministry of Finance has again driven these
arrangements, and Chinese participation is
reportedly on par with other partners.
Similar donor coordination arrangements
are in place in Vanuatu and Tonga, but are less
developed and have been promoted to a greater
extent by ‘traditional donors’ and regional
bodies such as the Pacific Island Forum Sec-
retariat (through the peer review process estab-
lished as a result of the Cairns Compact). It is
widely believed that decisions are made
outside of these processes, a view that is sup-
ported by cases where ministers have pre-
sented projects at an advanced stage to the civil
service, with no regard for sectoral planning
priorities. Decision-making in relation to
Chinese assistance in Vanuatu is in many cases
blatantly political, with ministers presenting
project proposals designed to directly benefit
their constituencies. This is a reflection of the
political culture in Vanuatu, where political
leaders are expected to channel state resources
to constituents (Morgan 2004). Political
culture in Vanuatu has therefore adversely
affected planning and decision-making at the
national level. In Tonga, also, decision-making
outside of policy processes is evident. In the
case of the second China Eximbank loan, the
Ministry of Finance was informed of the loan
through the media. In the case of the first
loan, Ministry of Finance advice against the
loan was dismissed by government.
The role of central government agencies and
sector (or line) agencies has therefore had a
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bearing on the perceived and actual effective-
ness of Chinese assistance. The Ministries of
Finance in the Cook Islands and Samoa have
played an important role in establishing insti-
tutional arrangements that support aid effec-
tiveness, which have in turn helped to ensure
that Chinese-funded projects meet the objec-
tives of government. Ministries of Finance in
both countries have also been heavily involved
in negotiating and providing oversight of
Chinese assistance, even where assistance is in
an area traditionally the responsibility of a
sector or line agency. The involvement of these
central agencies is important, given their close
links to political leaders, their capacity relative
to sector or line agencies and their ability to
provide a broader assessment of the impact of
a project than is likely from a sector agency
(PRIF 2013). The role of the Ministry of
Finance (and Economic Planning) in Tonga
and Vanuatu has been less prominent, as out-
lined earlier.
Increased transparency has been another
result of efforts to improve aid effectiveness,
and has had an impact on the perceived and
actual success of Chinese-funded projects. It is
well-known that Chinese assistance is opaque,
although transparency is increasing as a result
of efforts by the Chinese government and
outside pressure. There has been limited trans-
parency in assistance to the four case study
countries. Contractual agreements were short
and lacking in detail. Pacific Island govern-
ment officials and leaders were unclear about
the relationship between contractors, China
Eximbank and the different Chinese govern-
ment ministries. Tender processes in Beijing
were opaque. One official noted that ‘all the
contractors provided a quote for the same
price, so how did they decide?’
Contractors were shown to play an impor-
tant role in establishing Chinese-funded proj-
ects. Contractors approached ministers with
assurances that they could arrange Eximbank
financing, despite construction funded by such
loans needing to proceed to tender. The same
companies offered assurances that conce-
ssional loans from Eximbank would be for-
given in the future—an assertion cited by
politicians as a reason that loans had received
their support.12 Lack of transparency in these
cases has clearly augmented the space for
political clientelism, enabling political leaders
to negotiate directly with Chinese contractors.
In Tonga and Vanuatu, lack of a transparent
process has contributed to suspicion of
Chinese assistance. In Tonga, the sensible act
of appointing a clerk of work from the private
sector for oversight of construction became
politically contentious due to lack of transpar-
ency. In Vanuatu, perceptions of corruption
among politicians have been made worse
due to the failure to adequately involve the
civil service in decision-making. Conversely,
clear decision-making processes involving a
wide range of stakeholders in Samoa and Cook
Islands have helped to improve community
awareness where Chinese stakeholders
provide limited information.
Another point of difference between the
countries is in the way sector agencies have
performed their functions. China does not
provide funding to governments for oversight
of construction (neither do many other devel-
opment partners, such as Japan). In Samoa,
there is recognition of the limited capacity of
the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infra-
structure to oversee construction; a clerk of
works from the private sector is hired through
open tender to perform the role. In Tonga, this
did not occur with the Eximbank loan for road
rehabilitation and construction. The situation
in Vanuatu has changed over time. The
Vanuatu government in the past provided
direct oversight of construction activities; a
strategy that was demonstrated to be ineffec-
tive (some construction projects, such as the
Vanuatu Agricultural College building, were
poorly built). It now hires a clerk of works
to oversee construction activities, in what
civil servants argued was a demonstration of
how government has learned from previous
Chinese assistance.
12. The activities of contractors were a concern among
Chinese embassy representatives. But Chinese embassy
officials also argued that greater clarity was needed on
lines of responsibility and processes within Pacific Island
governments, pointing to mixed messages from different
ministries and politicians.
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A similar learning process is evident in the
Cook Islands. Earlier projects funded by China
achieved mixed results, with a number of
buildings being poorly constructed, limited
domestic employment creation and assistance
targeting areas that are not development priori-
ties. The Ministry of Finance now emphasises
the importance of policy processes for ensur-
ing adequate oversight and targeting of assis-
tance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
developed a three-year strategy for allocating
grant funding. As one official explained, ‘we
now know better how to deal with the
Chinese’.
Pacific Island countries are also learning
from one another. Civil servants from the
Vanuatu Ministry of Infrastructure and Public
Utilities have communicated with colleagues
in Tonga about oversight arrangements and
negotiating strategies prior to discussions with
Chinese contractors. Tongan officials have
spoken to colleagues in the Cook Islands.
There is clearly potential for lessons to be
transferred across countries; a statement
repeated by numerous civil servants inter-
viewed for this project. Such ‘organic’ trans-
fers are driven by Pacific Island civil servants
that seek better ways of negotiating and over-
seeing Chinese assistance. They are more
likely to be successful than aid effectiveness
efforts that are promoted externally. One
promising model is the trilateral cooperation
project in the Cook Islands, which is being led
by the Cook Islands Ministry of Finance.
Many countries in the region are following this
new arrangement with interest as it may offer
a framework for their own management of
Chinese and ‘traditional donor’ assistance.
This article has argued that a key to the success
of this model is that it is an initiative
established and driven by the Cook Islands
government.
5. Conclusion
A number of factors will influence the scale
and nature of Chinese assistance to the Pacific
in the future. Political dynamics within coun-
tries will clearly play a key role. There is
ongoing concern in Pacific Island countries
about ministers seeking personal gain from
Chinese engagement—particularly grant aid.
The ability of governments to prevent this type
of behaviour will have an important bearing
on the perceived and actual effectiveness of
Chinese assistance. National planning and
donor coordination mechanisms that enhance
transparency have the potential to assist in this
task, and will also impact the ability of Pacific
Island governments to address other chal-
lenges, such as appropriate oversight of con-
struction and debt sustainability.
The impact and effectiveness of Chinese
development assistance in Pacific Island coun-
tries is therefore dependent in large part on the
actions of Pacific Island governments. Pacific
Island countries are key players in the negotia-
tion, oversight, implementation and (ulti-
mately) effectiveness of Chinese assistance.
Research in four case study countries—Tonga,
Vanuatu, Samoa and Cook Islands—reveals
the central role that Pacific Island governments
themselves play in managing Chinese aid. It
also highlights the important role of Chinese
contractors in both the delivery and negotia-
tion of projects. This role poses a challenge for
both Pacific Island governments and the
Chinese government in terms of project
oversight, potential corruption and broader
reputational damage; and is an area where
further research is required. The article has
argued that there is evidence of countries
learning from experience and adhering to (or
developing better) processes to respond to
these challenges. The Chinese government too
is recognising the need for more appropriate
assistance, and is using the trilateral coopera-
tion project as an important pilot case. Local
development of oversight and planning
arrangements by government stakeholders is
more important than ever, given the latest
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